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1. Introduction
Paraphrasing Nash (1951), there are two approaches to game theory: axiomatic
and strategic.  By giving different insights on a problem, the two approaches are
complementary.  This paper applies the axiomatic approach to the prekernel of games
in coalitional form, thereby complementing the strategic analysis that Serrano (1995)
made of this solution concept.  The extension of the prekernel to games of non-
transferable utility (NTU) has been perceived as a challenging problem, and the
strategic approach has proven to be useful to this aim.  Thus, Serrano (1995) finds that
the prekernel is the set of payoffs such that every pair of players' Nash product is
critical (Previous attempts to extend the prekernel to NTU games (Kalai (1975), Billera
and McLean (1994)) are not satisfactory.  Both papers try to extend the notion of a
coalition excess to NTU games).
Harsanyi (1959) proposes "reduced games" with respect to pairs of players to
analyze "consistency" and "converse consistency" on a class of multi-person pure
bargaining problems.  In the same spirit as Harsanyi's, we investigate the implications
in the model of NTU games of a well-known internal consistency property and its
converse with respect to bilateral negotiations as formulated by two-person Davis-
Maschler (1965) reduced games.  Consistency and its converse are the key axioms used
by Peleg (1986) in order to characterize the prekernel of transferable utility (TU)
games.  Roughly speaking, our characterization combines the axioms of Peleg (1986)
for the TU prekernel and those of Nash (1950) for the Nash solution to bilateral
bargaining problems.  In this sense, our work resembles Aumann's (1985) and Hart's
(1985) axiomatizations of the Shapley NTU value and the Harsanyi value, respectively.
These theorems combine the axioms of Nash (1950) and those of Shapley (1953).  Our
theorem is also a pure axiomatization, in the sense that it is not restricted to a class
where a certain solution concept is nonvacuous.  We regard the existence problem and
the axiomatic characterization as two completely separate issues.  Our main theorem
says that, for the class of smooth NTU games, the prekernel is the only solution that
satisfies consistency, converse consistency, and a set of five axioms of the Nash type
imposed on the subclass of two-person smooth problems1 : nonemptiness, scale
invariance, equal treatment for TU games, Pareto efficiency, and local independence.
The equal treatment property for TU games is a weaker requirement than Nash's
original symmetry axiom.  On the other hand, local independence is stronger than the
"independence of irrelevant alternatives" axiom.  Local independence is introduced and
studied by Nagahisa (1991) for the characterization and implementation of the
                                               
1   In this sense, our work resembles Aumann's (1985) and Hart's axiomatizations of the Shapley NTU
value and the Harsanyi value, respectively.  These theorems combine the axioms of Nash (1950) and
those of Shapley (1953).3
Walrasian allocation rule in exchange economies (see also Dutta, Sen and Vohra
(1995), Nagahisa and Suh (1995), Saijo, Tatamitani and Yamato (1993)).  The basic
idea can be traced back to Inada (1964), who proposes this condition to investigate the
Arrow impossibility theorem in economic environments.  The condition says that "if at
a commodity allocation all agents have a common marginal rate of substitution under
preference profiles  u  and  u', then the allocation should be chosen as a socially optimal
outcome for  u'  whenever it is selected for  u."  The version in this paper expresses
essentially the same concept in the payoff space.
We also show that for the class of smooth games with the cores nonempty, the
same axioms as in our main theorem characterize the intersection of the core and the
prekernel.  This is related to Moldovanu's (1990) partial axiomatization of this
intersection for convex assignment problems.
The paper is organized as follows.  Section 2 presents the model, while Section
3 is devoted to the consistency properties of the prekernel.  Section 4 contains our main
result, as well as examples to show that the axioms are independent.
2. The Basic Model
Denote by  R  the set of the real numbers.  If  N  is a nonempty finite set, denote
by  |N|  the cardinality of  N, and by  RN  the set of all functions from  N  to  R.  We
identify an element  x  of  RN  with an  |N|-dimensional vector whose components are
indexed by members of  N; thus we write  xi  for  x(i).  If  x ˛ RN  and  S ￿ N, we
write  xS  the restriction of  x  to  S, which is the element of  RS  that associates  xi
with each  i ˛ S.  Let  S ￿ N, and  Y ￿  RS.  We define  _Y = {y ˛ Y | There is no  x ˛
Y  such that  xi  > yi for all  i ˛ S}, and  intY  as the interior of  Y.  A representation
for  Y  is a function  g  from  RS  to  R  such that  Y = {x ˛ RS | g(x) ² 0} and  intY =
{x ˛ RS | g(x) < 0}.  We also write  gi(x)  for the partial derivative of  g  at  x Œ RS
with respect to component  i ˛ S, and  ￿g(x)  for the gradient vector of  g  at  x ˛ RS.
The pair  (N, V)  is a coalitional game, or simply a game if  N  is a nonempty
finite set, and  V  is a correspondence that associates with every  S ￿ N  a nonempty
subset  V(S)  of  RS  such that
(1)  V(S)  is  closed, and comprehensive;
(2)  for each xS ˛ RS, _V(S)˙({xS}+R+S)  and  _V(S)˙({xS}-R+S) are compact; and
(3)  for each  (xS , ys) ˛ V(S)·_V(S), xS  = ys  if  xS  ³ ys (nonlevelness)2.
Let  V(N)  be the class of correspondences  V  such that all  (N, V)  are games.  A
member of  N  is a player, and a nonempty subset of  N  is a coalition in the game  (N,
V).  A payoff to player  i  is a point of  R{i}, and a payoff profile on coalition  S  is a
point of  RS.4
The game  (N, V)  is smooth if there is a differentiable representation  g  for
V(N)  with positive gradients on  _V(N); namely for each  i ˛ N, gi(x) > 0  at any  x ˛
_V(N).  A class  G  of games is rich if for every  (N, V) ˛ G, G  contains all two-person
games in which the players are members of  N.
A transferable utility game, or simply a TU game, is a smooth game  (N, V)
which is defined by a function  v  that associates with every coalition  S  a real number
v(S)  such that  V(S) = {xs ˛ RS | _i˛sxi ² v(S)}  for every coalition  S.  We abuse the
notation, and use  (N, v)  to denote the associated coalitional game.
Let  G  be a nonempty class of games.  A solution on  G  is a relation  s  which
associates with every  (N, V) ˛ G  a subset  s(N, V)  of  V(N)  (could be empty).
Definition. Let  ({i, j}, V)  be a two-person smooth game.  The prekernel of  ({i, j}, V)
is:
Prk({i, j}, V) = {x ˛ _V({i, j}) | gi(x)(xi - vi) = gj(x)(xj - vj)},
where  g  is a representation for  V({i, j}), and  (vi, vj) = (maxV({i}), maxV({j})).
Remark 2.1.  Solution  Prk  reduces to the Nash bargaining solution on the class of
two-person smooth games  ({i, j}, V)  such that  V({i, j})  is a convex set containing
(vi, vj).
Definition.  Let  G  be a nonempty class of games.  Then a solution  s  on  G  satisfies
nonempty-valuedness  (NEV ) if  s(N, V) _ Ø  for each  (N, V) ˛ G; and
Pareto efficiency  (PE ) if  s(N, V) ￿ _V(N)  for each  (N, V) ˛ G.
Remark 2.2.  On the class of two-person smooth games, Prk  satisfies NEV and PE.
Let  (N, v)  be a TU game, and  i, j  be two distinct players in  N.  Then  i  and  j
are substitutes in  (N, v)  if  v(S¨{i}) = v(S¨{j})  for all  S ￿  N\{i, j}.
Definition.  Let  G  be a class of games.  A solution  s  on  G  satisfies the equal
treatment property  (ETP) for TU games if for each  x ˛ s(N, v), xi = xj whenever  (N,
v)  is a TU game in  G, and  i  and  j  are substitutes in  (N, v).
Remark 2.3.  On the class of two-person smooth games, Prk  satisfies ETP for TU
games.
Let  (N, V)  be a game, a ˛ R++N, and  b ˛ RN.  For each coalition  S, we
define the function  lsab  from  RS  to itself by  lsab(xS) = (aixi + bi )i˛s;  for each  xS5
˛ RS.  We then consider  lab(V)  as the correspondence that associates with every
coalition  S  a set  lab(V)(S) = {yS ˛ RS | yS = lsab(xS)  for some  xS ˛ V(S)}.
Definition.  Let  G  be a class of games.  A solution  s  on  G  satisfies scale invariance
(SIV) if for each  (N, V) ˛ G, each  a ˛ R++N, and each  b ˛ RN, s(N, lab(V)) =
lNab(s(N, V))  whenever  s(N, V) _ Ø.
Remark 2.4.  On the class of two-person smooth games, Prk  satisfies SIV.
Definition.  Let G be a nonempty class of two-person smooth games.  A solution  s  on
G  satisfies local independence (LID ) if for each  ({i, j}, V) ˛ G, each  x ˛ s({i, j},
V), and each  V' ˛ V({i, j}),
x ˛ ¶V({i, j}) ˙ ¶V'({i, j});
(maxV({i}), maxV({j})) = (maxV'({i}), maxV'({j}));
￿g(x) // ￿g'(x)2
￿ x ˛ s({i, j}, V'),
where  g  and  g'  are respectively representations for  V({i, j})  and  V'({i, j}).
Remark 2.5.  On the class of two-person smooth games, Prk  satisfies LID.
Remark 2.6.  Let  (N, V)  be a smooth game.  Suppose that there is a smooth economy
(N, Z, A, u)  which generates the outcomes of  V  as the utility possibility sets of
coalitions: Z  is a common consumption set for all the agents in  N, A  is a
correspondence that associates with every coalition  S  a nonempty subset  A(S)  of  Z,
which denotes the set of feasible allocations for coalition  S, and  u = (ui)i˛N  is a
profile of agent's utility functions which are defined on  Z  and differentiable in its
interior.2
For each coalition  S, define the function  uS  by the Cartesian product of  ui, i ˛
S.  Then  V(S)  is derived as the image  uS(A(S))  of  A(S)  under  uS.  For each utility
profile  x  on  ¶V(N), the gradient vector of  ¶V(N)  at  x  can be shown to be
proportional to the vector of marginal utilities of all the agents with respect to any
commodity.  Its direction is then unique up to any transformations of utility functions
such that the marginal utility vectors of all the agents change proportionally.
Let  E  be a nonempty class of smooth economies.  For each  (N, Z, u, A) ˛ E,
denote by  U(N, Z, A)  the class of utility functions  u'  such that  (N, Z, u', A) ˛ E.  An
allocation rule on  E  is a relation  j  that associates with every  (N, Z, u, A) ˛ E  a
subset  j(N, Z, u, A)  of  A(N).  The Pareto rule on  E  is the allocation rule  P  that
assigns to every  (N, Z, u, A) ˛ E  the set  P(N, Z, u, A)  of Pareto efficient allocations6
in  A(N).  We may thus translate the above version of local independence for the payoff
space to that for the commodity space as follows:
An allocation rule  j  on  E  satisfies local independence  if for each  (N, Z, u, A) ˛
E, each  z ˛ j(N, Z, u, A) ˙ intZ, and each  u' ˛ U(N, Z, A),
z ˛ P(N, Z, u, A) ˙ P(N, Z, u', A);
supui(A(i)) = supui'(A(i)), ui,(z) = ui,'(z)  for every  i ˛ N;
￿u(z) // ￿u'(z)
￿ z ˛ j(N, Z, u', A),
were  ￿u(z) = (￿ui(z))i˛N, and  ￿u'(z) = (￿ui'(z))i˛N.
This is not identical with the original one by Nagahisa (1991).  He does not put on the
conditional part either the restrictions of Pareto efficiency or the invariance of utilities.
Further the proportionality implies more than the invariance of marginal rates of
substitutions.  The above requirement is thus weaker than his one.
Proposition 1.  Let  G{i, j}  be the class of two-person smooth games  ({i, j}, V).  Then
a solution on  G{i, j}  satisfies NEV, PE, ETP for TU games, SIV, and LID  if and only if
it is  Prk.
Proof.  The solution  Prk  on  G{i, j}  satisfies NEV, PE, ETP for TU games, SIV, and
LID.  Now we prove the uniqueness.  Say  i = 1, and  j = 2.  Let  ({1, 2}, V)  be a two-
person smooth game, and  s  a solution on  G{i, j}  which satisfies  NEV, PE, ETP for
TU games, SIV, and  LID.  We prove that  s({1, 2}, V) = Prk({1, 2}, V).
By NEV, there exists x = (x1, x2) ˛ Prk({1, 2}, V).  By PE, x ˛ ¶V({1, 2}).  By
differentiability, there is a unique tangent line of the curve  _V({1, 2})  at  x: ￿g(x)·(z -
x) = g1(x)(z1 - x1) + g2(x)(z2 - x2) = 0.  Define the two-person smooth game  ({1, 2},
V')  by  V'({1}) = V({1}), V'({2}) = V({2}), and  V'({1, 2}) = {z ˛ R{1, 2} | ￿g(x)·(z -
x) ² 0}.  Then, by the LID of  Prk, x ˛ Prk({1, 2}, V').  Note that
Prk({1, 2}, V')={([(g2(x)/g1(x)(x2-v2')+x1+v1']/2, [(g1(x)/g2(x)(x1 -v1')+ x2+v2']/2)},
which is the midpoint of the segment on the line  _V'({1, 2})  truncated by  (v1', v2') =
(maxV'({1}), maxV'({2})).  Hence, {x} = Prk({1, 2}, V') (see Figure 1).2   Define the
TU game  ({1, 2}, w)  by  w({1}) = 0 = w({2}), and  w({1, 2}) = g1(x)(x1 - v1') +
g2(x)(x2 - v2').  By NEV, PE and ETP for TU games, s({1, 2}, w) = {(1/2)w({1, 2}),
(1/2)w({1, 2})}.  Let  a = (1/g1(x), 1/g2(x)), and  b = (v1', v2').  By SIV,
s({1, 2}, lab(w)) = lNab (s({1, 2}, w))
= {((1/2g1(x))w({1, 2}) + v1', (1/2g2(x))w({1, 2}) + v2'))}
= Prk({1, 2}, V') = {x}.
                                               
2   We do not necessarilly assume that  (vi, vj) ˛  V({i, j})  for all  ({i, j}, V) ˛ G{i, j}.7
Note that  ({1, 2}, lab(w))  is the game  ({1, 2}, V').  Hence, s({1, 2}, V') = s({1, 2},
lab(w)) = {x}, so that  x ˛ s({1, 2}, V').  By LID, x ˛ s({1, 2}, V).  Thus, Prk({1, 2},
V) ￿ s({1, 2}, V).  In exactly the same way, we can show that  s({1, 2}, V) ￿ Prk({1,
2}, V).  Hence, s({1, 2}, V) = Prk({1, 2}, V).  `
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3. Reduced Game Properties of the Prekernel
The following is a two-person "reduced game" studied by Peleg (1986, 1992).
Let  PN ” {P ￿ N | |P| = 2}, which is the set of two-person coalitions in  N.
Definition.  Let  (N, V)  be a game,  x ˛ V(N), and  P ˛ PN.  The two-person reduced
game of  (N, V) with respect to  P given  x  is the pair  (P, VxP)  of  P  and the
correspondence  VxP  that associates with every  S ￿ P  a subset  VxP(S)  of  RS, where
VxP({i}) = {yi ˛ R{i}| (yi, xQ) ˛ V({i}¨Q), Q ￿ N\P}  for each  i ˛ P, and  VxP(P) =
{yp ˛ Rp |(yp, x–p) ˛ V(N)}.34
Definition.  Let  (N, V)  be a game.  The prekernel of  (N, V)  is:
Prk(N, V) = {x ˛ _V(N) |gi(x)(xi-vi(x–{i, j})) = gj(x)(xj-vj(x–{i, j}))  for each  i, j ˛N},
where  g  is a representation for  V(N), and  vi(x–{i, j})), vj(x–{i, j})) = (maxVx{i,j}({i}),
maxVx{i,j}({j})).
Definition.  Let G be a nonempty class of smooth games.  A solution  s  on  G  satisfies
local independence (LID) if for each (N, V) ˛ G, each x ˛ s(N, V), and each V' ˛
V(N),
x ˛ ¶V(N) ˙ ¶V'(N);
" P ˛ PN, " Q ￿ N\P, " i ˛ P, vi({i}¨Q; xQ) = vi'({i}¨Q; xQ);
￿g(x) // ￿g'(x)8
￿ x ˛ s(N, V'),
where  g  and  g'  are respectively representations for V(N) and V'(N), vi({i}¨Q; xQ) =
max{yi ˛ R{i}| (yi, xQ) ˛ V({i}¨Q)}, and vi'({i}¨Q; xQ) = max{yi ˛ R{i} | (yi, xQ) ˛
V'({i}¨Q)}  for each  P ˛ PN, each  Q ￿ N\P, and each  i ˛ P.
Remark 3.1.  To redefine the above statement for the commodity space, we need to
impose more restrictions of invariance of utility levels on the translation in Remark 2.6.
Thus the above version is even weaker than the previous one.
Definition.  Let  G  be a nonempty class of games.  Then a solution  s  on  G  satisfies
bilateral  consistency  (BCS ) if
" (N, V) ˛ G, " x ˛ s(N, V), " P ˛ PN, (P, VxP) ˛ G & xP ˛ s(P, VxP).
Definition.  Let  G  be a nonempty class of games.  Then a solution  s  on  G  satisfies
converse consistency  (CCS ) if
" (N, V) ˛ G, " x ˛ _V(N),[(" P ˛ PN, xP ˛ s(P, VxP)) ￿ x ˛ s(N, V)].
Remark 3.2.  On a rich class of smooth games, Prk  satisfies  BCS  and CCS.
Remark 3.3.  Let  G{i, j}  be the class of two-person smooth games  ({i, j}, V).  Then a
solution on  G{i, j}  satisfies NEV, PE, ETP for TU games, SIV, LID, BCS, and CCS  if
and only if it is  Prk.
4. A Characterization of the Prekernel
We have checked that on a class of smooth games, the solution  Prk  is nonempty-
valued, and satisfies  PE, ETP for TU games, SIV, and LID.  We next show that it is
uniquely characterized by two-person versions of all the axioms together with bilateral
consistency and its converse.
Theorem 1.  Let  G0  be a rich class of smooth games.  A solution on  G0  satisfies NEV
for two-person games, PE for two-person games, ETP for two-person TU games, SIV
for two-person games, and LID for two-person games, BCS and CCS if and only if it is
Prk.
Proof. The solution  Prk  on  G0  satisfies NEV for two-person game, PE for two-
person game, ETP for two-person TU games, SIV, LID, BCS, and CCS.  Now we
prove the uniqueness.  Let  (N, V) ˛ G0, and  s  a solution on  G0  that satisfies  NEV,9
PE, ETP for TU games, SIV and LID for two-person games, and satisfies  BCS and
CCS  on  G0.  We prove that  s(N, V) = Prk(N, V).  The proof for  |N| = 1  is trivial.
We have already proven the case of  |N| = 2.  Then consider the case of  |N| ‡ 3.
Suppose that  Prk(N, V) _ Ø.  Let  x ˛ Prk(N, V).  By the BCS of  Prk, xP ˛
Prk(P, VxP)  for every  P ˛ PN.  Hence, xP ˛ s(P, VxP)  for every  P ˛ PN.  By the
CCS of  s, x ˛ s(N, V).  Hence, Prk(N, V) ￿ s(N, V).  Note that  s(N, V) _ Ø.  Then
we can similarly show that  s(N, V) ￿ Prk(N, V).  Thus, s(N, V) = Prk(N, V).
Suppose that  Prk(N, V) = Ø.  Let  x ˛ _V(N).  By the CCS of  Prk, there exist
at least one pair  Q  of players in  N  such that  xQ ˇ Prk(Q, VxQ).  Since  (Q, VxQ)  is a
two-person game, we have  Prk(Q, VxQ) = s(Q, VxQ), so that  xQ ˇ s(Q, VxQ).  By the
BCS of  s, x ˇ s(N, V).  Hence, there is no payoff profile in  s(N, V), so that  s(N, V)
= Ø.  Thus, s(N, V) = Prk(N, V). `
In Theorem 1, we have used seven axioms.  It does not look so elegant, and Lensberg
(1988) actually proves that under consistency, we do not need any such conditions as
the "independence of irrelevant alternatives" to axiomatize the Nash solution on the
class of pure bargaining problems with valuable populations.  The following examples
show that we are not able to drop any of the seven axioms to characterize  Prk  on a
class of smooth games even with valuable populations.
Example 4.1:  For every  (N, V) ˛ G0, let  s(N, V) = Ø.  Then  s  vacuously satisfies
all the conditions except  NEV for two-person games.
Example 4.2:  For every two-person game  (P, V), define
b(P, V) = (vi)i˛P if  (vi)i˛P ˛ intV(P);
Prk(P, V) if  (vi)i˛P ˇ intV(P).
For every  (N, V) ˛ G0, let  s(N, V) = {x ˛ V(N)| xP ˛ b(P, VxP)  for all  P ˛ PN}.
Then  s  satisfies all the conditions except  PE  for two-person games.
Example 4.3:  For every  (N, V) ˛ G0, let  s(N, V) = _V(N).  Then  s  satisfies all the
conditions except ETP for two-person TU games.
Example 4.4:  For every  (N, V) ˛ G0, let  s(N, V) = {x ˛ _V(N)| xi - vi(x–{i, j}) = xj-
vj(x–{i, j})  for each  i, j ˛ N}.  Then  s  satisfies all the conditions except  SIV  for
two-person games.
Example 4.5:  For every two-person game  (P, V), define  a(P, V) = (ai(P, V))i˛P  by
ai(P, V) = max{xi ˛ R{i}| (xi, v-i) ˛ V(P)}  for all  i ˛ P.  For every  (N, V) ˛ G0, let
s(N, V) = {x ˛ ¶V(N)| xP ˛ [(vi(x-P))i˛P, a(P, VxP)]  for each  P ˛ PN}, where  [c, d]10
= {(1 - t)c + td | 0 ² t ² 1}  for each  c, d ˛ RP.  That is, for every pair  P  of players in
N, xP  is the maximal point of the feasible set  VxP  on the segment connecting  (vi(x-
P))i˛P  to  a(P, VxP)  if  x ˛ s(N, V).  Note that  s  is a modification of the Kalai-
Smorodinsky bargaining solution, and  s  satisfies all the conditions except  LID  for
two-person games.
Example 4.6:  Let  (N, V) ˛ G0, and  i, j ˛ N.  Then  i  and  j  are equivalent if
gi(x)(x)(vi({i}¨S; xS) - vi) = gj(x)(vj({j}¨S; xS) - vj)  for every  x ˛ _V(N), and for
each  S ￿ N\{i, j}, where  vi({i}¨S; xS) = max{yi ˛ R{i}| (yi, xS) ˛ V({i}¨S)}  for
each  i ˛ N, and each  S ￿ N\{i}.  Note that  gi(x)(vi(x–{i, j}) - vi) = gj(x)(vj(x–{i, j})) -
vj)  for every  x ˛ _V(N)  if players  i  and  j  are equivalent.  Now let  s(N, V) = {x ˛
_V(N) | gi(x)(xi - vi) = gj(x)(xj - vj)  if  i, j ˛ N  are equivalent}.  We can verify that  s
satisfies the five axioms imposed on two-person games: NEV, PE, ETP for TU games,
SIV, and LID.  If  |N| = 2, then the two players in  N  are equivalent, and  s(N, V) =
Prk(N, V).  To prove that  s  satisfies  CCS,  suppose that  x ˛ _V(N)  is such that  xP
˛ s(P, VxP) = Prk(P, VxP)  for each  P ˛ PN.  Since Prk  satisfies  CCS,  x ˛ Prk(N,
V).  We show that  Prk(N, V) ￿ s(N, V)  if  |N| ³ 3.  Let  x ˛ Prk(N, V).  Then  x ˛
_V(N).  Assume that  i, j ˛ N  are equivalent.  Since  x ˛ _V(N), we have  gi(x)(vi(x–
{i, j}) - vi) = gj(x)(vj(x–{i, j})) - vj), so that  gi(x)(xi - vi) - gj(x)(xj - vj) = gi(x)(xi - vi(x–
{i, j})) - gj(x)(xj - vj(x–{i, j})).  Since  x ˛ Prk(N, V), we have  gi(x)(xi - vi(x–{i, j})) =
gj(x)(xj - vj(x–{i, j})), so that  gi(x)(xi - vi) - gj(x)(xj - vj) = 0. Hence, x ˛ s(N, V), i.e.,
Prk(N, V) ￿ s(N, V).  Thus, s  satisfies  CCS.  Suppose that  N = {1, 2, 3}, and  V  is a
TU game defined by  v({1}) = v({2}) = v({3}) = 0, v({1, 2}) = 4, v({1, 3}) = 3, v({2,
3}) = 2, and  v({1, 2, 3}) = 6.  Then  (N, V)  has no pair of equivalent players, so that
s(N, V) = _V(N).  Let  x = (2, 2, 2) ˛ s(N, V), then  s({1, 2}, V(x-{1, 2})) = {(2.5,
1.5)}.  Hence, s  does not satisfy  BCS.
Example 4.7:  For every  (N, V) ˛ G0, let  s(N, V) = {x ˛ Prk(N, V) | vi(x-{i, j}) = vi(x-
{i, k})  for each  i, j, k ˛ N with  j _ i _ k}.  Note that  s(N, V) = Prk(N, V)  if  |N| = 2.
Then  s satisfies all the conditions except CCS.
Remark 4. 1.  The solution  Prk  satisfies  PE, ETP for TU games, SIV, and LID over
the class of  n-person smooth games, n ³ 2.  It does not satisfy, however, NEV over the
same class (see Serrano (1995, Example 2), and Moldovanu (1990, p.188)).
We next study the intersection of the core and the prekernel on the class of
games with nonempty core.11
Definition.  Let  (N, V)  be a game, S ￿ N, and  x ˛ RN.  Then  S  can improve upon
x  if there is  y ˛ V(S)  such that  yi > xi  for all  i ˛ S.  The core of  (N, V)  is:
C(N, V) = {x ˛ V(N)| There is no coalition that can improve upon  x}.
Definition.  Let  ({i, j}, V) be a two-person smooth game.  The core-kernel of  ({i, j},
V)  is:
CK({i, j}, V) = {x ˛ C({i, j}, V) | gi(x)(xi - vi) = gj(x)(xj - vj)},
where  g  is a representation for  V({i, j}), and  (vi, vj) = (maxV({i}), maxV({j})).
Remark 4.2.  The solution  CK  reduces to the Nash bargaining solution on the class of
two-person smooth games  ({i, j}, V)  such that  V({i, j})  is a convex set.
Proposition 2.  Let  GC{i, j}  be the class of two-person smooth games  ({i, j}, V)  with
nonempty core.  Then a solution on  GC{i, j}  satisfies NEV, PE, ETP for TU games, SIV,
and LID  if and only if it is  CK.
Proof.  The solution  CK  on  GC{i, j}  satisfies NEV, PE, ETP for TU games, SIV, and
LID.  Now we prove the uniqueness.  Say  i = 1, and  j = 2.  Let  ({1, 2}, V)  be a two-
person smooth game, and  s  a solution on  GC{i, j}  which satisfies  NEV, PE, ETP for
TU games, SIV, and  LID.  We prove that  s({1, 2}, V) = CK({1, 2}, V).
By NEV, there exists  x = (x1, x2) ˛ CK({1, 2}, V).  By PE, x ˛ _V({1, 2}).
By differentiability, there is a unique tangent line of the curve  _V({1, 2})  at  x:
￿g(x)·(z - x) = g1(x)(z1 - x1) + g2(x)(z2 - x2)  = 0.  Define the two-person smooth game
({1, 2}, V')  by  V'({1}) = V({1}), V'({2}) = V({2}), and  V'({1, 2}) = {z ˛ R{1, 2} |
￿g(x)·(z - x) ² 0}.  Then, by the LID of  CK, x ˛ CK({1, 2}, V').  Note that
CK({1, 2}, V')={([(g2(x)/g1(x)(x2-v2')+x1+v1']/2, [(g1(x)/g2(x)(x1 -v1')+ x2+v2']/2)},
which is the midpoint of the segment on the line  _V'({1, 2})  truncated by  (v1', v2') =
(maxV'({1}), maxV'({2})).  Hence, {x} = CK({1, 2}, V') (see Figure 2).3   Define the
TU game  ({1, 2}, w)  by  w({1}) = 0 = w({2}), and  w({1, 2}) = g1(x)(x1 - v1') +
g2(x)(x2 - v2').  By NEV, PE and ETP for TU games, s({1, 2}, w) = {(1/2)w({1, 2}),
(1/2)w({1, 2})}.  Let  a = (1/g1(x), 1/g2(x)), and  b = (v1', v2').  By SIV,
s({1, 2}, lab(w)) = lNab (s({1, 2}, w))
= {((1/2g1(x))w({1, 2}) + v1', (1/2g2(x))w({1, 2}) + v2'))}
= CK({1, 2}, V') = {x}.
Note that  ({1, 2}, lab(w))  is the game  ({1, 2}, V').  Hence, s({1, 2}, V') = s({1, 2},
lab(w)) = {x}, so that  x ˛ s({1, 2}, V').  By LID, x ˛ s({1, 2}, V).  Thus, CK({1, 2},
                                               
3  For every  ({i, j}, V) ˛ GC{i, j}, C({i, j}, V) _ Ø, i.e.,  (vi, vj) ˛  V({i, j}).12
V) ￿ s({1, 2}, V).  In exactly the same way, we can show  s({1, 2}, V) ￿ CK({1, 2},
V).  Hence, s({1, 2}, V) = CK({1, 2}, V).  `
Definition.  Let  (N, V)  be a game.  The core-kernel of  (N, V)  is:
CK(N, V) = {x ˛ C(N,V) | gi(x)(xi-vi(x-{i, j})) = gj(x)(xj-vj(x-{i, j})) for each i, j ˛ N},
where  g  is a representation for  V(N), and  (vi(x-{i, j}), vj(x-{i, j})) = (maxVx{i, j}({i}),
maxVx{i, j}({j})).
Theorem 2.  Let  GC  be a rich class of smooth games with nonempty core.  A solution
on  GC  satisfies NEV for two-person games, PE for two-person games, ETP for two-
person TU games, SIV two-person games, and LID for two-person games, BCS and
CCS if and only if it is  CK.
Proof. The solution  CK  on  GC  satisfies NEV for two-person game, PE for two-
person game, ETP for two-person TU games, SIV, LID, BCS, and CCS.  Now we
prove the uniqueness.  Let  (N, V) ˛ GC, and  s  a solution on  GC  that satisfies  NEV,
PE, ETP for TU games, SIV and LID for two-person games, and satisfies  BCS and
CCS  on  GC.  We prove that  s(N, V) = CK(N, V).  The proof for  |N| = 1  is trivial.
We have already proven the case of |N| = 2.  Then consider the case of |N| ‡ 3.
Suppose that  CK(N, V) _ Ø.  Let  x ˛ CK(N, V).  By the BCS of  CK, xp ˛
CK(P, V(x–p))  for every  P ˛ PN.  Hence, xp ˛ s(P, V(x–p))  for every  P ˛ PN.  By
the CCS of  s, x ˛ s(N, V).  Hence, CK(N, V) ￿ s(N, V).  Note that  s(N, V) _ Ø.
Then we can similarly show that  s(N, V) ￿  CK(N, V).  Thus, s(N, V) = CK(N, V).
Suppose that  CK(N, V) = Ø.  Let  x ˛ _V(N).  Then by the CCS  of  CK, there
exist at least one pair  Q  of players in  N  such that  xQ ˇ CK(Q, V(x–Q)).  Since  (Q,
V(x–Q))  is a two-person game, we have  CK(Q, V(x–Q)) = s(Q, V(x–Q)), so that  xQ ˇ
s(Q, V(x–Q)).  By the BCS of  s, x ˇ s(N, V).  Hence, there is no payoff profile in
s(N, V), so that  s(N, V) = Ø.  Thus, s(N, V) = CK(N, V). `13
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Moldovanu (1990, Theorem 5.2) considers the same solution on the class of
NTU assignment games.  For characterization, he implicitly assumes that the solution
under investigation is single-valued for two-person games of the domain.  He thus uses
the "independence of irrelevant alternatives" as one of the axioms instead of local
independence.  If we do not assume either such a single-valuedness condition or local
independence, we are not able to show more than that the solution contains the
intersection of the core and the prekernel, that is, s(N, V) ￿ CK(N, V)  for every game
(N, V)  of the domain.
The following examples show the independence of the axioms in Theorem 2.
Example 4.1':  For every  (N, V) ˛ GC, let  s(N, V) = Ø.  Then  s  vacuously satisfies
all the conditions  except NEV for two-person games in  GC.
Example 4.2':  For every two-person game  (P, V), define  d(P, V) = (vi)i˛p.  For every
(N, V) ˛ GC, let  s(N, V) = {x ˛ V(N)| xP ˛ d(P, VxP)  for all  P ˛ PN}.  Then  s
satisfies all the conditions  except PE for two-person games in  GC.
Example 4.3':  For every  (N, V) ˛ GC, let  s(N, V) = C(N, V).  Then  s  satisfies all
the conditions except ETP for two-person TU games in  GC.
Example 4.4':  For every  (N, V) ˛ GC, let  s(N, V) = {x ˛ _V(N)| xi - vi(x-{i, j}) = xj
- vj(x-{i, j})  for each  i, j ˛ N}.  Then  s satisfies all the conditions except SIV for two-
person games in  GC.
Example 4.5':  For every two-person game  (P, V), define  a(P, V) ” (ai(P, V))i˛p  by
ai(P, V) = max{xi  ˛ R{i}| (xi , v–i) ˛ V(P)}  for all  i ˛ P.  For every  (N, V) ˛ GC, let
s(N, V) = {x ˛ _V(N)| xP ˛ [(vi(x–p))i˛p, a(P, VxP)]  for each  P ˛ PN}.  Then  s
satisfies all the conditions except LID for two-person games in  GC.14
Example 4.6':  For every  (N, V) ˛ GC, let  s(N, V) = Prk(N, V).  Then  s  satisfies all
the conditions except ETP for two-person TU games in  GC.
Example 4.7':  For every  (N, V) ˛ GC, let  s(N, V) = {x ˛ CK(N, V) |  vi(x-{i, j})  =
vi(x-{i, k})   for each  i, j, k ˛ N with  j _ i _ k}.  Note that  s(N, V) = CK(N, V)  if  |N|
= 2.  Then  s satisfies all the conditions except CCS.
Remark 4. 3.  The solution  CK  satisfies  PE, ETP for TU games, SIV, and LID over
the class of  n-person smooth games with nonempty core, n ³ 2.  It does not satisfy,
however, NEV over the same class (see Moldovanu (1990, p.188)).15
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